Developing a Revenue Sharing Method for an Operational Transfer-Operate-Transfer Project by Du, Y. et al.
 Sustainability 2019, 11, 6436; doi:10.3390/su11226436 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability 
Article 
Developing a Revenue Sharing Method for  
an Operational Transfer-Operate-Transfer Project 
Yanhua Du 1,2,*, Jun Fang 1, Yongjian Ke 3, Simon P Philbin 4 and Jingxiao Zhang 5,* 
1 School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China; 
whutfj@126.com 
2 School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics,  
Zhengzhou 450015, China 
3 Senior Lecturer, School of Built Environment, University of Technology Sydney,  
Ultimo, NSW 2007, Australia; yongjian.ke@uts.edu.au 
4 Professor, Nathu Puri Institute for Engineering and Enterprise, London South Bank University,  
London SE1 0AA, UK; philbins@lsbu.ac.uk 
5 Professor, School of Economics and Management, Chang′an University, Xi′an 710064, China 
* Correspondence: duyh@zua.edu.cn (Y.D.); zhangjingxiao@chd.edu.cn (Y.Z.) 
Received: 16 October 2019; Accepted: 13 November 2019; Published: 15 November 2019 
Abstract: The transfer-operate-transfer (TOT) project model is used widely as a commercial 
framework for public-private-partnerships to support provision of infrastructure and enable the 
delivery of services. However, operational delivery of such projects can encounter certain 
challenges, such as the need for improved revenue sharing between governmental and private 
partners. The purpose of this paper is to design a revenue sharing method (RSM) that satisfies the 
revenue-sharing forecast in the contract design stage and the realized revenue sharing in the 
contract execution period for an operational TOT project. This approach identifies the impact of 
external uncertainty and effort level as well as the input ratio on revenue sharing of participants, 
distributes and reasonably minimizes the project revenue uncertainty among the participants, and 
achieves an improved matching of the participants’ revenue sharing with their risk-sharing, 
resource input and effort level. The paper utilizes the fuzzy-payoffs Shapley value method for 
revenue distribution for an operational TOT project, where the fuzzy alliance and input ratio 
coefficient are adopted to gradually optimize the Shapley value and form the RSM of an 
operational TOT project. The RSM allows prediction of the revenue sharing of participations under 
uncertain conditions of project revenue and supports improved decision-making by participants. 
Keywords: operational TOT project; PPP project; Shapley value; fuzzy payoffs; double-fuzzy 
revenue sharing  
 
1. Introduction 
The public-private-partnership (PPP) model has been widely used for providing public 
infrastructure and services around the world [1]. In this context, a transfer-operate-transfer (TOT) 
project is one of the common modes of the PPP model, which applies to existing facilities and does 
not involve the task of construction. In recent years, in order to reduce local governments’ debt 
levels and improve the operational efficiency of existing public services, the Chinese central 
government has encouraged the transformation of existing public services into cooperation projects 
between a government and private partner (known as social capital in China). This is achieved 
through deployment of the TOT model, which involves a private partner participating in the 
operations of the public service [2]. In this scenario, since the private partner is not a charitable body, 
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it requires a reasonable return on investment [3–5]. Indeed, the royalty fee of a TOT project acts as a 
substitute for investment cost [6]. The government determines the franchise period based on the 
payback period under the minimal internal rate of return (IRR) as expected by the concessionaire 
[7]. Therefore, the expected revenue of a TOT project during franchise period is the project revenue 
corresponding to the project company’s expected minimal IRR. If the TOT project is fully invested 
and operated by the private partner, the expected project revenue during the franchise period will 
completely belong to the private partner. However, if the government participates in the project 
investment, the expected project revenue during the franchise period needs to be reasonably 
distributed between the government and the private partner. However, characterized by large-scale 
investments and long franchise periods, TOT projects generally have high risks accompanied with 
revenue uncertainty. Since it is affected by the project risk, the IRR and revenue of the TOT project 
may deviate from expectations; on the other hand, if the effort level of the participants fails to meet 
expectations, the IRR and revenue of the project will also be lower than expected. Accordingly, the 
private partner cannot recover its investment, which can thereby trigger renegotiation of the 
contract and even project failure, such as in the case of the Tianjin Shuanggang Garbage 
Incineration Power Plant, Jingtong Expressway, and Hangzhou Bay Cross Sea Bridge in China [8]. 
Furthermore, when the project revenue or IRR is much greater than expected, this will potentially 
lead to disagreement and conflict among the project stakeholders. For example, the Beijing Capital 
Airport Expressway, and the Quanzhou Wutong Bridge both failed to provide a reasonable 
distribution plan due to excessive profits, which resulted in a series of problems such as the 
government and companies competing for profits, the potential for default, as well as public 
opposition [9]. Indeed, many PPP projects have encountered disputes or failures since the realized 
revenues may not be in line with the expectations when the project was initiated. This scenario can 
lead to an imbalance of revenue distribution between the government and the private partner [10], 
thereby increasing any renegotiation costs [11], as well as increasing government debt risks for 
Minimum Revenue Guarantees (MRG) of the PPP project. The payment mechanism of the project is 
the primary means of enabling an effective revenue-risk distribution [12] and means of incentive for 
the participants to achieve or exceed the expected revenue and IRR of the project. Therefore, in 
order to address these problems, there is a need to establish a revenue-sharing method (RSM) that 
matches revenue uncertainty, effort, and resource input for an operating TOT project jointly 
invested by government and private partner (hereafter called operating TOT). 
In the study of revenue distribution research with revenue uncertainty, there are relatively few 
researchers investigating the flexible RSM as a way of calculating project total revenue. In the 
current situation and in order to encourage a private partner to actively participate in PPP projects, 
government departments provide the MRG or guarantee the minimum return rate to overcome 
revenue uncertainty in regard to project risk [13–15]. In this scenario, the government department 
will also need to stipulate the Maximum Revenue Cap (MRC) to prevent the private partner from 
profiteering [16,17]. The revenue exceeding the MRC level is called excess revenue. Therefore, many 
scholars have studied the excess revenue distribution of PPP projects. Such scholars believe that the 
government and private partner should share excess returns according to a specified distribution 
[11,16,17]. In the case of the revenue distribution model with MRG and MRC, the evaluation 
standards of MRGs and the MRC become the focus of disputes. Moreover, the MRG increases the 
risk of the government subsidy expenditure and the level of government debt [11]. This is contrary 
to the purpose of reducing subsidy expenditure or the debt of the government. Indeed, Abrate et al. 
[18] used dynamic price variability on revenue maximization and found that higher dynamic price 
variability leads to higher revenues for hotels. Theoretically, project revenue can be maximized 
through dynamic price variability of product or service to reduce the risk of government guarantee. 
However, in general, the price of public facilities influences social interests, and the price adjustment 
procedure is can be overly complicated, difficult and may not significantly reduce the risk of the 
government guarantee for the project. 
At the same time, revenue uncertainty is one of the main reasons for renegotiation of PPP 
contracts [19]. PPP projects require far more flexibility and adaptability of contractual relationships 
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than traditional types of procurement [12,20]. Therefore, in regard to research on avoiding 
renegotiation for revenue uncertainty, many scholars have sought to achieve the equilibrium of 
benefits between two parties by adjusting several key variables, such as franchise period, franchise 
fee, product or service price [21–23]. However, renegotiating or adjusting the franchise period and 
the franchise fee requires a reassessment of the realized and future project revenue, which can be 
costly and lacking in flexibility for decision-making [9]. 
In addition, the uncertainty of effort level not only causes revenue uncertainty, but also affects 
the revenue-sharing ratio (RSR). However, there is a lack of research on the impact of effort level 
uncertainty on revenue sharing. Wang et al. [17] pointed out that the effort level of participants is 
related to the proportion of excess revenue when analyzing the revenue sharing in excess revenue. 
Some scholars in China also regarded the efforts as an influential factor for the RSR [24–26]. 
However, insufficient consideration has been given both internationally and in China to the impact 
of uncertain and/or inadequate effort levels on project revenue and revenue sharing. 
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to design an RSM that satisfies the revenue-sharing 
forecast in the project design and contract negotiation stage as well as the revenue sharing in the 
contract execution period of an operational TOT project. The method deployed emphasizes the 
impact of certain effort levels on revenue sharing, increases the flexibility of the contract, avoids the 
governments’ debt risk increasing due to the MRG, reduces the likelihood of renegotiations, and 
minimizes the project revenue uncertainty among the participants reasonably, which is caused by 
the external uncertainty and effort level uncertainty. Consequently, an improved matching can be 
achieved of the operational TOT project revenue sharing with risk sharing, resource input and effort 
level. This should have the effect of encouraging the participants improve their effort levels for the 
project.  
The main contribution of this research study has three aspects. (1) The paper proposes a concise 
algorithm for the input ratio correction coefficient, which simplifies the method and supports further 
method adoption. (2) The double-fuzzy Shapley value method proposed in this paper predicts the 
revenue sharing of participants under project revenue uncertainty. This enables participants to be 
clear on the impact of project revenue uncertainty on revenue sharing and make more reasonable 
decisions in the contract design stage. (3) The revenue uncertainty is reasonably apportioned among 
the participants in proportion through this method to avoid the possible dispute of determining the 
MRG and MRC. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Common Methods of Revenue Sharing in PPP Projects 
Kang et al. [27] believe that the PPP contract itself can be regarded as a scheme to enable 
revenue sharing between the government and the private sector. Indeed, many PPP contracts 
contain revenue-sharing clauses [28,29], and some general contracts also use revenue-sharing 
contracts [30]. Game theory is a major way to study revenue-sharing contracts [31]. Kang et al. 
[27,32] developed a heuristic algorithm for the bi-level programming problem involving the 
government and the private partner, and they reached a revenue-sharing scheme between the 
government and the private partner through the process of bargaining. However, the learning effect 
of this method must be determined subjectively, which influenced its objectivity to some extent. 
Wang et al. [17] developed an approach that involved excess revenue sharing between the 
government and investors, which was based on incentive and principal-agent theories. The authors 
also believed that the sharing ratio for excess revenue was related to the fairness preferences and the 
effort cost coefficient of the investors. Alas, they only allocated excess revenue without considering 
the total project revenue. Furthermore, Shang et al. [33] established a bargaining model for 
energy-saving revenue distribution using Rubinstein’s bargaining game theory. The researchers 
obtained an effective bargaining interval that was satisfactory to both parties through the game, but 
the solution was not unique. The non-uniqueness and uncertainty of the Nash bargaining model 
solution can be considered as a limitation of this method.  
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There are other revenue distribution methods. For instance, Carbonara et al. [34] proposed a 
model for assessing and benchmarking the net benefits of the different Energy Performance 
Contracting (EPC) structures. They used the net present value (NPV) differential minimization 
method to balance the profit demand of the private sector and the economic interests of the public 
sector for selecting the EPC schema, which thereby creates a “win-win” solution for both parties. 
However, it can be observed that there were insufficient considerations about how much the 
participants contribute to the process. 
2.2. Shapley Value Evolution and its Application in TOT Project Revenue Sharing 
Shapley value is a method proposed by L.S. Shapley in 1953 in order to solve the cost-sharing 
revenue distribution of alliance members in classical cooperative games [35]. This approach 
provides a strict axiomatic description to subjective concepts, such as “fairness” or “reasonableness”, 
and is an established way to study the fair revenue distribution within the alliance [36]. Later, many 
scholars studied the Shapley value for the scenario of the fuzzy cooperative game. On the one hand, 
Shapley value is studied under fuzzy alliance. In this regard, Aubin [37] formally proposed the 
concept of fuzzy alliance and fuzzy game in 1974, that is, the players participate in multiple alliances 
with a participation rate between 0–1 as a fuzzy game with a fuzzy alliance. In 2001, Tsurumi [38] 
proposed to calculate Shapley under fuzzy union conditions using the Choquet integral. 
Furthermore, Shapley value can be studied under the fuzzy condition of payoff function. Mares [39] 
proposed a cooperative strategy with fuzzy payoffs. Chen et al. [40] extended the axiom of the 
classical Shapley value to Shapley value with interval fuzzy payoff by fuzzy set theory. Zhao et al. 
[41] extended the participation of fuzzy alliance to fuzzy value and proposed the triangular fuzzy 
structure element expression of the double-fuzzy Shapley value of fuzzy alliance and fuzzy payoffs 
combination. The above theoretical research of Shapley value provides theoretical support for the 
analysis of the impact of revenue uncertainty on revenue sharing for the TOT project.  
As for the application research of the Shapley value method for the case of PPP project revenue 
sharing, many scholars have proposed multi-factor correction of the Shapley value, as detailed in 
Table 1. Hu et al. [42] established a modified Shapely value PPP project revenue distribution model, 
taking into account investment proportion, risk allocation coefficient, contract execution degree and 
contribution degree. Li et al. [43] proposed a Shapley value correction model for sewage treatment 
projects that took into account risk factors, contribution of investment and contribution of 
innovation ability to ensure the fairness of income distribution. The method of multi-factor 
correction of Shapley value usually uses the product of the TOT project revenue and the difference 
between one factor weight and 1/n to adjust the revenue sharing one by one. The calculation method 
is relatively cumbersome. In addition, the method of multi-factor correction of Shapley value fails to 
consider the impact of project revenue uncertainty on revenue sharing. Yu et al. [44] introduced 
uncertainty into the revenue distribution model and proposed the interval Shapley value method to 
obtain the participants’ fuzzy revenue-sharing interval. However, the projects’ revenue uncertainty 
and the participants’ revenue-sharing were not sufficiently matched. Also, Zhang [45] respectively 
applied fuzzy-payoffs Shapley value and fuzzy-alliance Shapley value to study the revenue 
distribution of contract energy management projects but were not able to combine fuzzy payoffs and 
fuzzy alliance to solve the revenue distribution. 
Table 1. Modifying factors and disadvantage of different modified Shapley Value methods. 
Research Study Modifying Factors Unconsidered Factors 
Hu et al. [42] 
Investment proportion,  
risk allocation,  
contract execution degree,  
contribution degree. 
Contribution of innovation  
revenue uncertainty,  
the uncertainty of effort level.  
Li et al. [43] 
Risk allocation,  
investment proportion,  
contribution of innovation. 
Contract execution degree  
revenue uncertainty,  
the uncertainty of effort level. 
Yu et al. [44] Revenue uncertainty,  Contribution of innovation,  
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investment proportion,  
risk allocation,  
contract execution degree. 
contract execution degree  
the uncertainty of effort level. 
Zhang [45] 
Revenue uncertainty,  
 or participation rate less than 1. 
Investment proportion,  
risk allocation,  
contract execution degree. 
2.3. Main Influencing Factors of Revenue Sharing for TOT Projects  
The revenue sharing is the product of the project revenue and the RSR, where the project 
revenue can be affected by external uncertainty and the effort level of participants [46]. The RSR is 
mainly related to the effort level and input ratio of the participants in the project [17,24]. The effort 
level not only affects the project revenue but also affects the RSR. The uncertainty about the effort 
level will lead to changes in project revenue and RSR, which is different from the external 
uncertainty and the input ratio. Therefore, this paper divides the factors affecting the revenue 
sharing into three indicators, namely: external uncertainty of the project, effort level, and input ratio. 
External uncertainties are mainly caused by total project risks. The effort level is mainly manifested 
in three aspects: contract execution degree, undertaking task complexity and mutual satisfaction. 
The resource input ratio consists of investment proportion, risk-sharing proportion, innovation 
investment proportion and critical problem investment proportion. 
In summary, very few scholars have explored how to distribute the operational TOT project 
revenue by revising the Shapley value method based on project external uncertainty, effort level and 
resource input ratio. Therefore, this paper analyzes revenue sharing on TOT projects by different 
methods and from the perspectives of external uncertainty, effort level and input ratio. Additionally, 
the paper constructs an RSM of the operational TOT project based on input ratio and double-fuzzy 
Shapley value in order to realize revenue sharing matching with project risk-sharing, effort level and 
resource input ratio of the participants. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Research Design 
This research study assumes that the project revenue changes along with external uncertainties 
and the effort level of participants, and that the total resource input of the project is unchanged.  
Due to the external uncertainty of the operational TOT project, the different input ratio of 
participants, and the failure to reach the expected level of effort, this study selects the modified 
Shapley value method to construct the RSM of the operational TOT project according to the findings 
from the literature review. The classic Shapley value is modified in three steps in combination with 
the three main influencing factors analyzed above. Firstly, an RSM based on fuzzy payoff Shapley 
value (hereafter called Method #1) is constructed to analyze the influence of revenue uncertainty on 
revenue sharing. Secondly, on the basis of Method #1, Shapley value is modified again by fuzzy 
alliance for effort level less than expected and its uncertainty, and then an RSM based on 
double-fuzzy Shapley value (hereafter called Method #2) is proposed for the impact of effort level 
less than expected and its corresponding uncertainty on project revenue and RSR. Finally, the 
correction coefficient of input ratio is proposed to further optimize the Method #2 for the impact of 
the participants’ input ratio on revenue sharing, and finally it constructs an RSM of an operational 
TOT project based on the input ratio and double-fuzzy Shapley value (hereafter called Method #3). 
The range of revenue uncertainty caused by external uncertainty is determined according to the 
risk assessment data for specific projects. The scores of the secondary indicators of effort level and 
input ratio are compiled through specific project data, and the weights of the secondary indicators 
are obtained by the expert scoring method as shown in Section 3.2 related calculations. 
3.2.  Parameter Calculation of the Effort Level and Input Ratio 
3.2.1. Calculation of the Effort Level 
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The secondary indicators of the effort level for an operational TOT project are contract 
execution degree, undertaking task complexity and mutual satisfaction, which are respectively 
denoted as R11, R12, R13. The scores of each indicator are Ui1, Ui2, Ui3, and the weights of each indicator 
are respectively denoted as w11, w12 and w13. Then, the expression of effort level is: 
11 1 12 2 13 3=i i i iw w wU U U U+ +  (1) 
The weight of the secondary indicators was determined by the expert scoring method, the score 
of the mutual satisfaction index is obtained through the questionnaire, and the scores of other 
indexes are obtained through the relevant data from the operational management of the project. In 
this research study, 16 experts were invited to use the coercive 0–4 scoring method to score the 
weight of the secondary indicators of effort level respectively. The highest score and the lowest score 
are removed from each index score, and the total score is shown in Table 2. The weight calculation 
process of each index is shown in Table 3. According to Table 3, w11 = 0.45, w12 = 0.24, and w13 = 0.31. 
Table 2. Expert scoring and score summary of effort level secondary indicators. 
Indicators 0 1 2 3 4 Number of Experts Score 
Importance of R11 relative to R12 0 1 4 9 2 16 39 
Importance of R11 relative to R13 0 2 4 8 2 16 37 
Importance of R12 relative to R13 1 6 7 2 0 16 23 
Table 3. Weight calculation of secondary index of effort level. 
Indicators R11 R12 R13 Score Corrected Score Weights 
R11 - 39 37 77 78 0.45 
R12 17 - 23 40 41 0.24 
R13 19 33 - 42 43 0.31 
Total    169 172 1 
3.2.2. Calculation of the Input Ratio 
The input ratio includes four indicators, namely, the investment proportion, risk-sharing 
proportion, innovation investment proportion and critical problem investment proportion, which 
are respectively written as R21, R22, R23 and R24, the scores of the secondary index are written as ηi1, ηi2, 
ηi3, ηi4, and the weights of the secondary index are written as w21, w22, w23 and w24. Then, the correction 
coefficient of input ratio is expressed as: 
21 1 22 2 23 3 24 4= +i i i i iw w w wη η η η η+ +  (2) 
The secondary index scores can be obtained through the contract and relevant data of the 
operational management of the project. The weights of the secondary index are determined by the 
expert scoring method. The specific process is similar to the expert scoring method in Section 3.2.1. 
The scoring and calculation procedures are shown in Table 4 and 5.  
According to Table 5, w21 = 0.29, w22 = 0.26, w23 = 0.24, and w24 = 0.21. 
Table 4. Expert scoring and score summary of input ratio secondary indicators. 
Indicators 0 1 2 3 4 Number of Experts Score 
Importance of R21 relative to R22 0 2 7 4 3 16 35 
Importance of R21 relative to R23 1 4 6 3 2 16 29 
Importance of R21 relative to R24 0 2 7 5 2 16 34 
Importance of R22 relative to R23 0 2 8 4 2 16 33 
Importance of R22 relative to R24 0 2 7 5 2 16 34 
Importance of R23 relative to R24 0 4 6 4 2 16 31 
Table 5. Weight calculation of secondary index of input ratio. 
Indicators R21 R22 R23 R24 Score Corrected Score Weights 
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R21 - 35 29 34 98 99 0.29 
R22 21 - 33 34 88 89 0.26 
R23 27 23 - 31 81 82 0.24 
R24 22 22 25 - 69 70 0.21 
Total     336 340  
3.3. Development of the Operational TOT Project RSM  
3.3.1. Relevant Concepts 
Definition 1. Fuzzy payoff Shapley value of the operational TOT project.  
According to the Shapley value theory, ( ),N v  is the fuzzy cooperative game of operational 
TOT project, where ( ) +: Pv N R→   and ( )=0v φ , and the fuzzy payoffs Shapley value is as follows [41]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 ! 2 != \
2!i i S
S S
v v S v S iϕ
∈
− −
−   
 
(3) 
This Shapley value does not represent revenue sharing, but only represents the revenue sharing 
proportion. The latter value of Shapley is the same as above. 
Definition 2. Double-fuzzy payoff function and double-fuzzy Shapley value of the operational TOT 
project. 
According to the definition of fuzzy alliance [37], the fuzzy alliance of an operational TOT 
project means that the participants in the project participate in the alliance with an effort level 
between 0–1. In this research study, the payoff function of the fuzzy cooperative game with fuzzy 
alliance and fuzzy payoff (short for double-fuzzy cooperative game) in an operational TOT project is 
as follows [37]:  
( ) ( )( )( ) 1
1 l
m S
FF l lh
l
v S S dv v S h h
−
=
 = = − 


       (4) 
The double-fuzzy Shapley value of the operational TOT project is as follows [41]: 
( )( ) ( ) [ ]( )( ) ( )1
1
l
m U
i i l lh
l
v U v U h hϕ ϕ
−
=
= −     
 
(5) 
Definition 3. Double-fuzzy Shapley value of the operational TOT project based on input ratio. 
The cooperation strategy based on investment proportion correction is denoted as 
( ): FFv G N Rη → , and ( )=0v
η φ , then the double-fuzzy Shapley value of the operational TOT project 
based on input ratio is as follows: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )2 ,i ii v vU U i g cηϕ ηϕ= =     (6) 
Definition 4. Structural element representation of fuzzy payoff and fuzzy effort levels.  
Let E be a triangular symmetric fuzzy structural element [40,41]. The value interval is E = [−1, 1], 
and its membership function is as follows: 
( )
1 , 1 0
1 ,0 1
0
x x
E x x x
else
+ − ≤ ≤
= − < ≤ ，  
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Let f and k be the monotone function with the same formal on interval E = [−1, 1]. ( ) ( )Sv S f E= , 
( ) ( )FF Sv S f E=  , ( )l lh k E= . 
Note f(x)=ax+b, k(x)=cx+d. 
The fuzzy number generated by the linear fuzzy structure element is: v a bE= + , h c dE= + . 
Then, ( )v f E= , ( )h k E= . 
3.3.2. RSM of the Operational TOT Project Based on Fuzzy Payoff Shapley Value 
According to Definition 4, the structure element linear expression of expected revenue of the 
operational TOT project based on fuzzy payoff is: 
TOT TOT TOTv a b E= +  (7) 
According to Formula (3) and Definition 4, the fuzzy payoff Shapley value of the operational 
TOT project is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )\ \1 ! 2 !2!i S S i S S iS N
S S
E a a b b Eϕ
⊆
− −  = − + +   (8) 
The RSR of the participants, which is based on fuzzy payoff are: 
( ) ( )( )=  
i
i
i
E
E
E
ϕβ
ϕ

  
(9) 
The revenue sharing of the participants based on fuzzy payoff are: 
=  i i TOTvγ β   (10) 
3.3.3. RSM of the Operational TOT Project Based on Double-fuzzy Shapley Value 
According to Formula (4) and Definition 4, the structural element linear expression of the 
double-fuzzy payoffs function is: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 1
1
+
m S
FF l l l lS S
l
v S a b E c c d d E
− −
=
 = + − + 

 
 
(11) 
According to Formula (5) and Definition 4, the structure element linear expression of the 
double-fuzzy Shapley value of the operational TOT project is: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( )
1 1
1
+
l
m S
i i l l l lh
l S N
E E H c c d d Eϕ ϕ
− −
= ⊆
    = × − +        



 
 
(12) 
The RSR of the participants, which is based on double-fuzzy Shapley value are: 
( ) ( )( )=  
i
i
i
E
E
E
ϕβ
ϕ
 
 (13) 
The revenue sharing of the participants based on double-fuzzy Shapley value are: 
=  i i TOTvγ β     (14) 
Where,  TOTv
  represents the expected revenue of the operational TOT project based on 
double-fuzzy Shapley value. 
3.3.4. RSM of the Operational TOT Project Based on Input Ratio and Double-fuzzy Shapley Value  
Project revenue does not change with the input ratio of participants, so  =  TOT TOTv v
η   . Where, 
 TOTv
η  is the expected revenue of the operational TOT project based on input ratio and double-fuzzy 
Shapley value. 
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According to Formula (6) and Definition 4, the structure element linear expression of the 
double-fuzzy Shapley value of operational TOT project based on the input ratio is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( )
1 1
1
2 =2 +
l
m S
i i i i i l l l lh
l S N
E v H E U c c d d Eηϕ η ϕ η ϕ
− −
= ⊆
    = × − +        



   
 
(15) 
The RSR of the participants, which is based on input ratio and double-fuzzy Shapley value are: 
( ) ( )( )=   i
i
i
E
E
E
η
η
η
ϕβ
ϕ
   
(16) 
The revenue sharing of the participants, which is based on input ratio and double-fuzzy 
Shapley value are: 
( )= ii TOTE vηη ηβγ ×    (17) 
4. Case Study  
4.1. Background of the Case 
The Laohekou City Funeral Service Center in Hubei Province of China is an existing 
operational infrastructure that is planning to adopt the TOT project model. It is a typical operational 
TOT project with an investment return mechanism using the “user pays” approach. The project 
location is shown in Figure 1 and as depicted at the yellow star. 
 
Figure 1. The location of the operational transfer-operate-transfer (TOT) project. 
In the operational TOT project, a Cemetery Management Office in Laohekou City acts as a 
government authorized investment representative (hereinafter referred to as the government) 
which jointly establishes a project company with private partner. The project company will 
purchase the existing project assets with RMB 115.9 million and invest RMB 3 million as the project 
liquidity. The government contributes approximately RMB 7.1 million, accounting for 20% of the 
capital; the private partner contributes approximately RMB 28.6 million, accounting for 80% of the 
capital. The cooperative operational TOT project has a franchise period of 15 years. 
According to the data of the “implementation plan of the PPP project of the Laohekou City 
funeral service” and the “value-for-money evaluation plan of the Laohekou funeral service PPP 
project”, regardless of the time value of funds, the total net profit of the project during the franchise 
period is RMB 46.06 million in the TOT mode. The total net profit of the project during the franchise 
period is RMB 28.34 million in the traditional mode. If the project is implemented by the private 
partner, the total net profit of the project during the franchise period is RMB 45.59 million according 
to the reasonable calculation of the relevant data of the traditional mode and TOT project mode. 
In the research study it is assumed that the range of revenue uncertainty caused by external 
uncertainty is ±10%; and the effort levels fluctuate ±0.05. The scores of each index of the 
Sustainability 2019, 11, 6436 10 of 19 
government and private partner are shown in Table 6. The scores in blue of Table 6 represent the 
assumed value. 
Table 6. The scores of each index of the government and private partner. 
Indicators Government  Private partner 
Effort Level 
Contract execution degree 1 0.75 
Undertaking task complexity 0.7 1 
Mutual satisfaction 0.9 0.7 
Input Ratio 
Investment proportion 0.2 0.8 
Risk-sharing proportion 0.3 0.7 
Innovation investment proportion 0.1 0.9 
Critical problem investment proportion 0.25 0.75 
4.2. Revenue Sharing of the Operational TOT Project Participants  
4.2.1. Revenue Sharing of the Operational TOT Project with Method #1 
According to the case data and definition 4, ( ) 28.34 2.83gf E E= + , ( ) 44.59 4.46cf E E= + , 
( ) 46.06 4.61TOTf E E= + , 46.06 4.61TOTv E= + . The interval of TOTv  is RMB 41.45–50.66 million. 
According to formula (8), { }, 14.90+5.95g g c Eϕ = , { }, 31.15+5.95c g c Eϕ = . 
According to formula (9), 
14.90+5.95
46.0 +6 11.90g
E
E
β =
, 
31.15+5.95
46.0 +6 11.90c
E
E
β =
. The interval of gβ  is [26.21%, 
35.98%], and the interval of cβ  is [73.79%, 64.02%]. 
According to formula (10), 
( )46.06 4.61
46.06 11.90
14.90+5.95=
+g
E E
E
γ +
, 
( )46.06 4.61
46.06 11.90
31.15+5.95=
+c
E E
E
γ +
. The 
interval of gγ  is RMB 10.87–18.23 million, and the interval of cγ  is RMB 30.59–32.43 million. 
4.2.2. Revenue Sharing of the Operational TOT Project with Method #2 
According to Formula (1) and case data, 0.9gU = , and 0.8cU = , ( ) 0.9 0.05gk E E= + , and 
( ) 0.8 0.05ck E E= + . Therefore, ( )1 ch k E=  and ( )2 gh k E= . 
According to Formula (11), 
20.51 9.11 39.68TOTv E E= + + . The interval of TOTv  is RMB 31.09–49.30 
million. 
According to Formula (12), 
2 631.75 2492.7 329. 85c E Eϕ = ++ , 
258.09 826.26 1475.73g E Eϕ + += . 
According to Formula (13), 
2
2
58.09 862.26 1475.73
87.84 +1494.01 3968+ .10g
E E
E E
β + +=
, 
2
2
631.75 2492.38
87.
29.7
84
5
39+ 68.101494.01 +c
E
E E
Eβ ++=
. 
The interval of gβ

 is 26.21–43.17%, and the interval of cβ  is 73.79–56.83%. 
According to Formula (14), 
( )22 20.58 8.62 14.760.88 +1= 0.51 9.11 39.6839.684.94 +g
E
E
EE
E
Eγ + + + +
, 
( )2
2
26.32 24.92
0.89 +1
0.30= 0.51 9.11 39.68
39.4. 6894 +c
E EE
E E
Eγ +++ +
. The interval of gγ
  is RMB 8.15–21.28 million, and the 
interval of cγ  is RMB 22.94–28.02 million. 
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4.2.3. Revenue Sharing of the Operational TOT Project with Method #3 
20.51 9.11 39.68TOT TOTv v E E
η
= = + +   . The interval of TOTv
η  is RMB 31.09–49.30 million. 
According to Formula (2) and the date in Table 1, 0.21gη = , and 0.79cη = . 
According to Formula (15), 
26.20+3.62 0.24g E E
ηϕ = + , and 
239.38+9.88 0.47c E E
ηϕ = + . 
According to Formula (16), 
( )
2
2 
6.20+3.62 0.24=
45.58+13.60 +0.71g
E
E E
E Eηβ +
, and 
( )
2
2 =
39.38+9.88 0.4
45.58+13.60
7
+0.71c
E
E E
E Eηβ +
. The 
interval of g
ηβ  is 8.63–16.80%, and the interval of cηβ
  is 91.37–83.20%. 
According to Formula (17), 
( )22
2
39.68 9.11 0.51
45.58+13
6.20+3.62
.60
0.
0.71
24
+g
E E
E E
E Eηγ += + +
, and 
( )2 22 39.68 9.11 0.5145.58+1
39.38+9.88
3.60
0.4
1
7
+0.7c
E EE
E
E
E
ηγ += + +
. The interval of g
ηγ  is RMB 2.68–8.28 million, and the 
interval of c
ηγ  is RMB 28.41–41.02 million. 
5. Results and Analysis 
The results and analysis involve comparison of the results of three RSMs, and the potential 
application function of Method #3, as well as the comparison of different modified Shapley value 
methods. Comparison 1 is the comparison of Method #1 with the classical Shapley value method to 
analyze the impact of external uncertainty on revenue sharing. Comparison 2 is a comparison of 
Method #2 with Method #1 in order to analyze the impact of effort level and its uncertainty on the 
project revenue and the RSR. Comparison 3 is the comparison of Method #3 with Method #2 to 
analyze the impact of input ratio on revenue sharing. 
5.1. Comparison 1 
When E = 0 in Method 1, the results are the revenue-sharing values based on the classic Shapley 
value. The revenue-sharing of Method #1 is the interval value of E = [−1,1], including E = 0. 
Therefore, the revenue sharing based on the classic Shapley value is a special point of the Method #1. 
The revenue interval value of the project indicates the uncertainty range of the project revenue 
caused by external uncertainty. The revenue-sharing interval value of the participant is the 
revenue-sharing range corresponding to the project revenue uncertainty. Consequently, the 
uncertainty of project revenue is reasonably distributed between the participants according to the 
respective RSRs. 
5.2. Comparison 2 
In Method #1, the efforts of the participants are equal to 1; while in Method #2, [ ]= 0.75,0.85ch , 
and [ ]= 0.85,0.95gh . 
5.2.1. Changes of Government Revenue Sharing Caused by Effort Level  
Figure 2 shows that the project revenue decreases due to the decreased effort level of the 
participants. While the RSR of the government increases for g ch h>
 
 as shown in Figure 3, and when 
the E value is low, the revenue sharing decreases, when the E value is high, the revenue sharing 
increases as shown in Figure 4. Comparing with Method #1, Method #2 shows that the project 
revenue decreases due to the decrease of effort level, and the RSR increases for g ch h>
 
, however, the 
revenue sharing is uncertain. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of TOTv  and TOTv  ( TOTv
η ). 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of gβ , gβ

 and g
ηβ . 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of g
γ
, g
γ
 and g
ηγ
. 
The data in Table 7 shows that, when E = 0.2, the effort level of the government decreases by 9%, 
the project revenue decreases by RMB 5.46 million, a decrease of 11.62%; while E = 0.2, the effort 
level of the government decreases by 11%, and the project revenue decreases by RMB 7.26 million 
with a decrease of 16.08%. Therefore, the expected revenue of the operational TOT project is 
positively correlated with the effort levels of the government. 
When E = 0.2, the RSR for the government increased by 5.42%, and the revenue sharing 
increased by RMB 0.44 million, which is an increase of 2.80%. When E = −0.2, its RSR increased by 
4.15%, and the revenue sharing decreased by RMB 0.71 million, which is a decrease of 4.98%. This 
indicates that RSR is positively correlated with E, and the project revenue is higher, and the revenue 
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sharing is increased when E is larger, the project revenue is lower, and the revenue sharing is 
reduced when E is smaller. Therefore, in order to maximize the benefits, participants not only should 
increase their RSRs, but also cooperate with each other in order to increase project revenue, which 
emphasizes the importance of cooperation in an operational TOT project. 
Table 7. Comparison of the revenue sharing of the government between Method #1 and Method #2 
(E = ±0.2). 
Indicators Effort level Project revenue Revenue-sharing ratio(RSR)  Revenue sharing 
E = 0.2 E = −0.2 E = 0.2 E = −0.2 E = 0.2 E = −0.2 E = 0.2 E = −0.2 
Method #1 1 1 46.98 45.14 33.23% 31.40% 15.61 14.17 
Method #2 0.91 0.89 41.528 37.88 38.65% 35.55% 16.05 13.47 
Comparison −0.09 −0.11 −5.46 −7.26 5.42% 4.15% 0.44 −0.70 
Comparison (%) −9% −11% −11.62% −16.08% - - 5.80% −4.98% 
5.2.2. Changes of Private Partner Revenue Sharing Caused by Effort Level 
Figures 2, 5 and 6 show that the project revenue decreases, and the RSR of the private partner 
decreases for c gh h<
 
, Moreover, the comparison of Method #2 with Method #1 highlights that the 
project revenue and the RSR change in the same direction, and that the revenue share changes more 
sharply in the same direction. 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of cβ , cβ  and cηβ . 
. 
Figure 6. Comparison of cγ , cγ  and c
ηγ . 
The data in Table 8 shows that when E = 0.2, the effort level of the private partner decreases by 
19%, the project revenue decreases by RMB 5.46 million, which is a decrease of 11.62% ; also, its RSR 
decreased by 6.29%, and the revenue sharing decreased by RMB 6.30 million with a decrease of 
19.84%. The comparison of Method #2 with Method #1 shows that, when the project revenue and 
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revenue sharing are both reduced with the reduction of the participants’ efforts, the revenue sharing 
will inevitably drop significantly; and vice versa. Therefore, the link between effort level and 
revenue sharing can more effectively motivate participants to improve their effort levels for 
achieving or exceeding the expected revenue of the project. 
Table 8. Comparison of the revenue sharing of the private partner between Method #1 and Method 
#2 (E = 0.2). 
Indicators Effort Level Project Revenue RSR Revenue Sharing 
Method #1 1 46.98 67.64% 31.78 
Method #2 0.81 41.52 61.35% 25.47 
Comparison −0.19 −5.46 −6.29% −6.30 
Comparison (%) 19% −11.62% — −19.84% 
5.3. Comparison 3 
As shown in Figure 2, the project revenue remains unchanged. Figures 3 and 4 show that the 
RSR and the revenue sharing of the government decrease due to the decreased input ratio. As shown 
in Figures 5 and 6, the RSR and revenue sharing of the private partner increased as a result of the 
increased input ratio. Compared with Method #2, Method #3 shows that the RSR and revenue 
sharing are positively correlated with the input ratio. 
Table 9 shows that when E = 0.2, the input ratio of the government decreases by 0.29, the RSR 
decreases by 24.31%, and the revenue sharing decreases by RMB 10.09 million, which is a decrease of 
62.89%. As shown in Table 4, when E = 0.2, the input ratio of the private partner increased by 0.29, 
the RSR increased by 24.31%, and the revenue sharing increased by RMB 10.09 million, which is an 
increase of 39.62%. Therefore, the higher the input ratio, the higher the RSR and the more revenue 
sharing, which can encourage private partners to actively invest in operational TOT projects. 
Table 9. Comparison of the revenue sharing of the participants between Method #3 and Method #2 
(E = 0.2). 
Indicators 
Government Private Partner 
Input Ratio RSR Revenue Sharing Input Ratio RSR Revenue Sharing 
Method #2 0.5 38.65% 16.05 0.5 61.35% 25.47 
Method #3 0.21 14.34% 5.96 0.79 85.66% 35.56 
Comparison −0.29 −24.31% −10.09 0.29 24.31% 10.09 
Comparison (%) −58% - −62.89% 58% - 39.62% 
5.4.  Potential Application from the Functional Analysis of Method #3 
The fuzzy payoff function of the operational TOT project and fuzzy value of revenue-sharing 
both have a corresponding fuzzy structure element value. The fuzzy element structure value enables 
the exact correspondence between the fuzzy payoff function and the revenue-sharing value in 
different stages of the contract. This approach can be applied to the following two scenarios. 
(1) Application in the Contract Design Stage.  
If the membership degree of the payoff function is known, the corresponding expected project 
revenue interval and the revenue-sharing intervals of participants and the RSR interval can be 
predicted. Therefore, the RSR that is based on the input ratio and the double-fuzzy Shapley value 
can predict the influence of external uncertainty, effort level uncertainty and the input ratio on the 
revenue sharing of participants. In other words, it meets the revenue-sharing forecast in the contract 
design stage. For example, when the membership degree is 0.8, there is −0.2 ≤ E ≤ 0.2 E, TOTv
η
  is RMB 
37.88–41.52 million, g
ηβ  is 12.79–14.34%, g
ηγ  is RMB 4.84–5.96 million, and c
ηβ  is 87.21–85.66%, and 
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c
ηγ  is RMB 33.04–35.57 million. As the vertical axis interval corresponding to point A and point B are 
shown in Figures 2 to 6 respectively. 
(2) Application in the Contract Execution Stage.  
If the operational TOT project revenue is known, the value of the participant’s RSR and level of 
revenue sharing can be calculated according to the corresponding fuzzy element value. That is to 
say, the RSR based on the input ratio and the double-fuzzy Shapley value can be used for accurate 
revenue sharing in the contract execution stage. Such as, if TOTv
η
  is RMB 41.52 million, E = 0.2, so the 
corresponding g
ηβ  is 14.34%, g
ηγ  is RMB 5.96 million, c
ηβ  is 85.66%, and cηγ  is RMB 35.57 million. 
They are points gBβ , gBγ , cBβ , cBγ , as shown in Figure 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
Therefore, the RSM can be applied to both the revenue-sharing forecast in the contract design 
phase and the accurate revenue sharing during the contract execution stage. In addition, the above 
application is an example of the total net profit of the project operational period. Similarly, this RSM 
can also be applied to the distribution of annual net profit of the operational TOT project in the 
contract execution period. 
5.5. Comparison of Different Modified Shapley Value Methods 
According to Section 2.3., there are three aspects associated with modifying of the Shapley 
value, which are fuzzy payoffs, fuzzy alliance, and input ratio coefficient. In addition to the 
“fairness” of the RSMs based on the modified Shapley value, the following features and 
applications highlight the improved performance of the method. (1) Flexibility, where revenue 
sharing changes with income uncertainty, and thus, the revenue-sharing approach is flexible. (2) 
Incentive, where RSR is positively correlated with effort level and input ratio. (3) Forecasting, 
where the revenue-sharing interval is forecast according to the change of revenue. (4) Exact 
distribution, where the participant’s revenue sharing is an exact value rather than an interval value. 
The methods used by Hu et al. [42], Li et al. [43], Yu et al. [44], Zhang [45] in 2.2 are noted as 
Method 4#, Method 5#, Method 6#, Method 7#. √ indicates the relevant characteristics of an RSM. The 
comparison of modifying forms, features and applications in Methods 3#, 4#, 5#, 6# and7# in terms of 
modifying forms and features are shown in Table 10.  
As shown in Table 10, each method has flexibility. Methods 4# and 5# are incentive as they are 
modified by the input-ratio coefficient. In addition, because they do not take into account 
uncertainties, the revenue sharing is exact, but they do not have the function of forecasting of 
revenue-sharing interval. Methods 6# and 7# are meliorated with fuzzy payoffs, which is predictive 
but not exact. Method 6# modified with input-ratio coefficient is incentive, while method 7# is lack of 
incentive without using input ratio coefficient. Method 3# is improved systematically based on 
double fuzzy and input-ratio coefficient. This method is both predictive and exact for triangular 
fuzzy element function expression. In addition, Method 3# has a better incentive by linking the 
revenue sharing of participants with the input ratio and the effort level, which promotes the 
participants to achieve or exceed the expected revenue and IRR of the project and promotes the 
enthusiasm of private parties to participate in TOT projects. 
Table 10. Comparison of Methods 3#, 4#, 5#, 6# and7# in terms of modifying forms and features. 
Factors Method 3# Method 4# Method 5# Method 6# Method 7# 
Modifying forms  
Fuzzy payoff √   √ √ 
Fuzzy alliance √    √ 
Input ratio √ √ √ √  
Effort level √ √  √  
Features  
Flexibility √ √ √ √ √ 
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Incentive √ √ √ √  
Applications  
Forecasting √   √ √ 
Exact distribution  √ √ √   
6. Conclusions 
This research study has identified the factors impacting revenue sharing from the perspective of 
influencing the project revenue and the RSR and categorizes the influencing factors according to 
three main areas: external uncertainty, effort level and input ratio. According to the three indicators, 
different methods have to be adopted in order to modify the Shapley value and construct an RSM of 
the operational TOT project based on input ratio and double-fuzzy Shapely value.  
The RSM has four components, which are as follows: (1) The fuzzy payoff Shapley value is used 
to enable the reasonable distribution of project revenue uncertainty, which is caused by external 
uncertainty among the participants according to the RSR. (2) The influence of effort level and its 
uncertainty on project revenue and the RSR is clarified based on the fuzzy alliance Shapley value, 
that is, the effort level of participants is positively correlated with the project revenue and revenue 
sharing. Further, the project revenue uncertainty that is caused by the effort level and its uncertainty 
is distributed reasonably. (3) The RSM simplifies the calculation method of the input ratio correction 
coefficient and solves the influence of the unequal input ratio of the participants on the revenue 
sharing in order to encourage the private partner to actively invest in operational TOT projects. (4) 
Finally, the RSM can meet the revenue-sharing forecast in the contract design stage and revenue 
sharing in the contract execution stage. Therefore, the RSM has the capacity to support a reasonable 
level of revenue sharing that is matched with risk sharing, resource input and the effort level of 
participants. This will also minimize the impact of project revenue uncertainty on individual 
participants, thereby reducing the likelihood of the need for contract renegotiations and help avoid 
the potential dispute of determining the MRG and MRC. In addition, the RSM emphasizes the effort 
level linked with project revenue and participants’ revenue sharing, which further encourages 
participants to enhance their effort levels to achieve or even exceed the expected project revenue.  
Analysis of the results of the case study investigation can be considered in terms of the 
following four main concluding points. (1) The uncertainty of the project revenue can be shared by 
the participants according to the required proportion, which distributes the revenue uncertainty 
among the participants. (2) When the project revenue decreases and the RSR increases with the 
decrease of effort level, the change of revenue sharing is uncertain. Consequently, when the effort 
level is higher, the project revenue is higher, the revenue sharing increases, and vice versa. Also, 
when the project revenue and revenue sharing are both reduced with the reduction of the 
participants’ efforts, the revenue sharing will inevitably drop significantly, and vice versa. This 
highlights that the effort level is positively correlated with the project revenue and revenue sharing. 
Thus, the project revenue and the revenue sharing all increase as the effort level is improved. This 
indicates that the effort level linked with revenue sharing can more effectively motivate participants 
to improve their respective effort levels to achieve the expected revenue of the project or even 
exceed the expectations. Therefore, the interests of both parties are ultimately maximized. (3) The 
resource input ratio is positively related to the RSR and the revenue sharing. The higher the input 
ratio, the higher the RSR and the revenue sharing, which encourage the private partner to actively 
invest in operational TOT projects. (4) The RSM can be applied to both the revenue-sharing forecast 
in the contract design phase and the accurate revenue sharing during the project operation period. 
In the contract design stage, the expected revenue during franchise period is the project 
revenue corresponding to the project company’s expected minimal IRR. The RSM distributes the 
revenue uncertainty among the participants proportionally according to the change of expected 
revenue and forecasts the revenue-sharing interval of the participants. Each participant decides 
whether to participate in the project based on the forecast results and respective risk attitude. That 
is, the RSM can provide a basis for participants’ investment decisions. As the forecast results have 
included both less-than-expected and more-than-expected revenue distribution. If the participant 
Sustainability 2019, 11, 6436 17 of 19 
decides to participate in the project, it means that it is an acceptance risk of revenue less than is 
expected for participants. Therefore, the government does not need to assume the MRG, and there 
is no need to allocate another plan for the revenue more than expected, which means that the RSM 
is more concise. In the contract execution stage, the RSM conducts exact revenue sharing according 
to realized revenue which is a point of the prediction interval. Thus, the revenue sharing meets 
respective expected minimal rate of return. 
This RSM is designed for the operational TOT projects based on the characteristics of the 
operational TOT projects. Therefore, the RSM cannot be directly applied to quasi-operational TOT 
projects and other types of PPP projects. In future studies and in order to expand the application 
scope of the RSM, relevant parameters need to be adjusted according to the characteristics of 
quasi-operational TOT projects or for other types of PPP projects. 
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